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I:  Introduction 
 
  Economists have long observed that recipients of welfare benefits in one period are 
substantially more likely than others to receive benefits in subsequent periods.  In their pioneering 
work on dynamic patterns of welfare participation in the U.S., Bane and Elwood (1983) presented 
two facts which have been confirmed by many authors since.  First, the longer a family is in receipt 
of welfare benefits the less likely they are to leave welfare.  Second, the longer a previous recipient 
remains off welfare, the less likely they are to return to welfare. 
  There are two competing interpretations often put forward for the observed persistence in 
welfare receipt.  The first is that there is a “welfare trap”, in that the receipt of welfare per se acts to 
change recipients behaviour and hence their propensity to experience benefit spells in the future.  
There are several explanations for this welfare dependence.  Participation in welfare programmes 
may lead to a reduction in labour supply, via a fall in the distribution of wage offers as a result of a 
deterioration in human capital and/or adverse signaling to employers.  Similarly, the opportunity cost 
of welfare participation may increase as the time off welfare increases, again through human capital 
effects.  Alternatively, welfare participation may increase the costs of working if participation 
directly affects family structure decisions such as marriage and childbearing.  Finally, a “welfare 
trap” may be explained by fixed costs of either exiting welfare, due to job search, and/or entering 
welfare, such as establishing eligibility. 
  The second explanation for the observed persistence in benefit receipt is that it reflects 
heterogeneity in the population, with some individuals and their families continuously in need of 
assistance.  Under this theory, the declining exit and reentry rates may simply be due to 
compositional changes in the respective populations.  For example, if the population of recipients 
consists of two groups, distinguished by their propensity to be eligible for welfare, then the observed 
likelihood of leaving welfare would decline irrespective of any behavioural change due to welfare 
participation.  This is because, over time, the low propensity group is more likely to leave welfare, so 
that the remaining population will consist disproportionately of the high propensity group.  A similar 
compositional effect would also explain the observed declining likelihood of return to welfare as 
time off welfare increases. 
  Both of these theories can explain persistence in benefit receipt, however the public policy 
implications of each are very different.  If the welfare system acts as a trap which creates a 
dependence among recipients, then public policy should give emphasis to reducing the duration of 
benefit receipt by, for instance, increasing the opportunity costs of benefit receipt.  On the other 
hand, if persistence in benefit receipt is primarily due to population heterogeneity, then suitable 
public policy should emphasise alleviating the effects of low income or improving the skills and 
opportunities of individuals on welfare, rather than the (dis)incentives associated with welfare 
benefits.  It is therefore important to understand the extent of persistence due to each of these 
competing theories. 
  This paper provides an econometric evaluation of these two competing hypotheses of welfare 
persistence using longitudinal data on benefit receipt and market outcomes of individuals over a four 
year period.  Rather than focusing on benefit participation as the dependent outcome of interest, we 
instead examine whether current receipt of welfare benefits has an effect on individuals’ future 
market outcomes, such as income or employment propensities.  In particular, we focus on the 
question of whether benefit receipt has an effect on future outcomes of individuals after controlling 
for confounding factors which might reasonably be expected to affect those outcomes.  Out primary 
focus in the empirical analysis is on whether receiving a benefit influences the future income of 
individuals after controlling for other factors which affect individuals’ incomes and may be 
correlated with their benefit receipt.  In addition, and in order to test the robustness of the results, we 




  The paper is organised as follows.  The next section describes the framework used to analyse 
the effects of benefit receipt on individuals income, or some other market outcome.  Section 3 
discusses the data used in the analysis.  We present the results in section 4, and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
II:  Analytical Framework 
 
  There are two factors which complicate the identification of the effects of benefit receipt on 
market outcomes.  The first is that individuals and families earnings and labour market status are 
correlated over time, independent of welfare benefits.  The second is that eligibility for welfare 
benefits depends directly on either individual or family income and/or their labour market status.  A 
consequence of these factors is that benefit recipiency can be expected to be serial correlated, 
irrespective of any behavioural effect associated with program participation.  In addition to these 
factors which affect eligibility, individuals may also respond to incentives provided by welfare 
benefits to become eligible, when they wouldn’t otherwise be.
1 This implies that to credibly identify 
the structural effects of benefit receipt on market outcomes of interest requires that a suitable 
specification for the outcome in the absence of any benefit program be adopted. 
  Several different approaches to assess the contribution of state dependence to the persistence in 
welfare participation have been adopted in the literature.  Two approaches that have been used are, 
first, direct econometric modeling of the welfare participation process to identify the effect of state 
dependence in participation (e.g., Chay and Hyslop, 1998; Chay, Hoynes and Hyslop, 1999); and, 
second, using social experimental data to measure the impact of state dependence on welfare 
participation by comparing the participation patterns of “treatment” and “control” groups (e.g. Plant, 
1984). 
  The framework developed here is a special case of a more general framework used to analyse 
the effects of training programs on earnings (e.g., see Ashenfelter, 1978).  It is also similar to the 
empirical approach used by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) to examine whether past labour market 
conditions have an effect on individuals’ current wages.  In the following discussion, we assume that 
the outcome of interest is individual's log(income), and the measure of benefit receipt is a dummy 
variable for whether the individual received any benefit income; however, we will also consider 
alternative measures in the empirical analysis.  We adopt a parsimonious dynamic specification for 
the outcome of interest: in the absence of benefit receipt, the outcome variable of interest (e.g. 
income) is assumed to follow a first-order dynamic process.  In particular, we assume the following 
specification: 
 
(1)   yit = Xit¢￿ + ￿yit-1 + 0it 
 
where yit is individual i's log(income) in period t, Xit is a vector of variables which affect income, and 
0it is a residual term.  The dataset which is used for the empirical analysis includes very little of 
demographic information, and contains only information on the individual's sex and age.  For this 
reason the models allow for unrestricted age effects and are estimated separately for males and 
females.  We return to this and related issues later.  Although more general income dynamics could 
be modeled by allowing additional lags of income, such generalisations quickly impose strong 
demands on the number of time periods of data required to estimate the model.  For this reason, we 
concentrate on the simplest dynamic specification, although this can and will be tested empirically. 
  We begin our analysis of whether benefit receipt has a (persistent) effect on income, by 
allowing for lagged benefit receipt to affect current income: 
 





where Bit-1 is a dummy variable for whether individual i received any benefit income in period (t-1).  
An obvious method to test the hypothesis that benefit receipt has no persistent effect on income in 
this framework is to test whether /=0 while, under the alternative hypothesis that there is welfare 
dependence, we would expect /<0.
2 The basic idea behind this is to test whether lagged benefit 
receipt has an effect on current income after controlling for lagged income. 
  There are several potentially important misspecifications associated with equation (2).  First, 
equation (2) assumes that current benefit receipt does not affect income, which is obviously a strong 
restriction.  If benefit receipt and income are negatively correlated contemporaneously, and benefit 
receipt is positively correlated over time, the estimate of / will be biased due to omitted variable 
bias.  Therefore, a more suitable specification would also control for current benefit receipt: 
 
(3)   yit = Xit¢￿ + ￿yit-1 + /0Bit + /Bit-1 + 0it 
 
Again, the hypothesis that there are no persistent benefit effects on income implies that /=0.   
  The second problem associated with equation (2) (and (3)) is that the effect of lagged benefit 
receipt on current income may capture transitory effects of benefit receipt on income.  For example, 
assuming B and y are negatively correlated contemporaneously then, after controlling for Bit and yit-1, 
we might expect to find a spurious positive correlation between yit and Bit-1.  In order to control for 
such effects, we model the dynamic specification of the model as being in terms of “benefit-
adjusted” income: 
 
(4)   yit - /0Bit = Xit¢￿ + ￿(yit-1 - /0Bit-1) + /Bit-1 + 0it 
or 
(4¢)   yit = Xit¢￿ + ￿yit-1 + /0Bit + /1Bit-1 + 0it 
 
where /1 = / - ￿/0.  One interpretation for equation (4) is that the appropriate measure of income is 
that which has been adjusted for the contemporaneous effects of benefits – i.e., (4) is equivalent to 
equation (2) with the income measure redefined as (y - /0B).  In this specification, the hypothesis that 
there are no persistent benefit effects on income implies that /=0 in (4), or /1=-￿/0 in (4¢).
3 
 
Econometric Estimation Issues 
  First, if 0i is a random residual term which is uncorrelated over time, then equation (2) can be 
estimated consistently in levels using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation.  For this specification, 
at least two periods of data are required.  However, the assumption that 0it is purely random is strong 
and likely to be unrealistic in this context.  In particular, given that the only socio-demographic 
factors observed in the data is the person's age and sex, unobservable factors are likely to be 
important in explaining individual incomes.  Such unobservable factors may include a person's 
ethnicity, level of education, qualifications and skills, and also regional location.
4  Also, such 
unobservable factors can be expected to be correlated with benefit receipt.  Assuming that the effects 
of these unobservable factors are approximately constant over time, then a reasonable specification to 
adopt for the residual is 0it = .i + uit, where .i is a person-specific term that is constant over time and 
uit is a purely random error component.  In this case, we can allow for arbitrary individual-effects in 
equation (2) by adopting a "fixed-effects" specification for .i, and .i can then be eliminated by first-
differencing the data: 
 
(5)   ßyit = ßXit¢￿ + ￿ßyit-1  + /ßBit-1 + ßuit 
 




1), so that ßyit-1 needs to be instrumented.  If the first-order dynamic specification is valid then yit-2 will 
be a suitable instrument for ßyit-1 – i.e., yit-2 will be uncorrelated with ßuit-1, and is correlated with ßyit-1. 
 For this specification at least three periods of data are required. 
  A similar approach can be adopted to estimate specifications (3) and (4).  In addition to the 
need to instrument ßyit-1, if benefit receipt is (contemporaneously) correlated with the transitory 
errors, u, then ßBit and ßBit-1 will also be correlated with ßuit, and instruments for these variables will 
be required: suitable instruments may be Bit-2 and Bit-3.  Given this choice of instruments, at least four 
periods of data are required to estimate these specifications. 
  Finally, with four periods of data it is possible to provide a partial test of the validity of the 
specifications by including yit-3 as an additional instrument, and testing the overidentification 
restriction implied in this specification.  Rejection of the overidentifying restriction will imply 
rejection of the adopted specification, which may occur as a result of either misspecified income 
dynamics or the relationship between benefits and income. 
 
 
III:  Data 
 
  The data we use is from an Inland Revenue Department (IRD) administrative database of 
individual income tax returns over the four year period corresponding to the 1994 – 1997 tax years. 
We have constructed a two-percent longitudinal random sample of individual income tax filers over 
this period, using information from two possible sources of individuals’ incomes.
5 The first source of 
information is the individual’s filed tax return (IR3 or IR5).  This source provides information on 
their income from National Superannuation, other combined PAYE earnings (wages and salaries, and 
welfare benefits), and other income types (interest, dividends, self-employment income, etc.); tax 
rebates; family support tax credits; and assessed tax.  Although the filed returns provide quite a 
detailed breakdown on income components, they do not enable wage and salary income to be 
distinguished from (non-Superannuation) welfare benefit income.  In addition, low income 
individuals with only PAYE income are not required to file tax returns, so there is likely to be 
significant non-random selection of higher income earners in the sample of IR returns.
6 However, in 
principle, the IR returns provide consistent income information on individuals who either have high 
wage and salary income, or receive income that is not subject to PAYE withholding tax, such as self-
employment income. 
  The second source of information comes from Tax Deduction Certificates (TDC), which are 
filed by payers who withhold PAYE tax from individuals’ earnings.  These payers are primarily 
employers and the Department of Social Welfare.
7 From the TDC source it is possible to separately 
identify wage and salary earnings; National Superannuation; other welfare benefits; earnings related 
ACC payments; family support paid during the year by NZISS; and tax deductions.  There are two 
advantages of having the TDC information: first, it enables wage and salary income to be 
distinguished from welfare benefit income; and, second, it provides information on the wage and 
salary, and benefit income of individuals who do not file IR returns.
8 
  Thus, the database includes relatively extensive information on individuals’ income receipt 
and their spells of benefit receipt in each year, although it does not provide detailed information 
about the timing of various benefit and other income spells during the year.  It is partly for this 
reason that we adopt a panel data modeling approach, which focusses on benefit receipt and income 
on a period-by-period basis, rather than a duration approach, which analyses how long individuals 
receive benefits, to the issues.
9 
  The demographic information on individuals in the IRD database is limited to their age and 
sex.  For the analysis here we exclude individuals in or near retirement age, and restrict the sample to 




on individuals in each of the four years, we focus on the (balanced) sample of individuals who have 
non-negative market income and positive gross income in each year.  Table 1 contains a description 
of the sample characteristics, and also compares the selected sample with the sample of 20-55 year 
old individuals who do not satisfy the selection criteria.  The selected sample makes up about three-
quarters of the overall sample of 20-55 year olds.  Individuals in this sample are on average slightly 
older (about 1.5 years), have considerably higher market and benefit income, and have a higher 
fraction of gross income from benefits than those who do not satisfy the selection criteria.  Thus, 
although the selection criteria excludes a significant fraction of the sample, the selected sample is 
arguably more representative of the population which has contact with the benefit system. 
 
 
Table 1:  Sample Characteristics 
   
 
   Males     Females   
 Balanced  Non-selected  Balanced  Non-selected 
 Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample 
   
 
Age  36.08 34.54  35.88 34.27 
  (.08) (.13)  (.08) (.12) 
 
Sample average: 
Market  Income 33.87  15.14  19.53  8.61 
  (.33) (.36)  (.16) (.18) 
 
Benefit  Income 1.38  0.96  2.60  1.28 
  (.02) (.03)  (.04) (.04) 
 
Gross  Income 35.25  16.10 22.13  9.89 
  (.32) (.36)  (.14) (.18) 
 
Disposable Income  26.71  13.37  18.20  8.32 
  (.25) (.80)  (.12) (.19) 
 
Benefit/Gross  Income  0.14 0.08  0.22 0.10 
  (.002) (.003)  (.003) (.003) 
 
Number of Years with: 
Benefit  Income 0.95  0.48  1.27  0.55 
  (.01) (.01)  (.01) (.01) 
 
Market  Income 3.69  1.60  3.49  1.55 
  (.01) (.02)  (.01) (.02) 
 
Number of Observations  15,310  5,095  14,324  5,830 
   
 
Notes:  Estimated standard errors in parentheses.  Incomes have been adjusted using the CPI and are expressed 
in constant (1998 $1,000) values.  The sample is restricted to individuals aged 20 – 55 (in 1996).  Other sample 
selection criteria require that individuals not have negative market income in any year, and have positive gross 





  As there is no theoretically implied definition for either yit or Bit in the framework above, the 
empirical analysis will examine the robustness of the results to alternative definitions.  Suitable 
measures of yit may be either market or gross income.  Gross or disposable income would be more 
suitable if log(income) were to be adopted, due to the prevalence of zero market incomes.  An 
alternative definition for yit could be as a binary variable for whether or not individual i received any 
market income in year t.  In this case the focus would be on whether benefit receipt affects the 
(labour) market participation behaviour of individuals.  The simplest definition for Bit is a dummy 
variable for whether individual i received any welfare benefit in year t.  However, alternative 
definitions could also include some measure of the intensity of benefit receipt.  The analysis will 
focus primarily on the dummy variable definition of B, but will also consider the fraction of total 
income received in the form of welfare benefits as an alternative measure. 
 
 
IV:  Empirical Results 
 
  Before discussing the results from the econometric analysis, we first present a simple 
description of the differences in various outcomes.  Tables 2 and 3 presents means of annual market 
and gross income, and the fraction of gross income from benefits, for each of the four sample years, 
for males and females respectively.  Each sample is stratified by individuals benefit receipt status in 
the final 2 years (1996 and 1997): the first column pertains to individuals who received no benefit 
income in either 1996 or 1997, which accounts for about three-quarters of the overall sample of 
males, and two-thirds of the sample of females; the second column pertains to individuals who 
received benefit income in 1997 but not in 1996 (about 5 percent of the samples); the third column 
pertains to those who received benefit income in 1996 but not in 1997 (about 5 percent of the 
samples); and column four pertains to those who received benefit income in both 1996 and 1997 
(one-sixth of males, and one-quarter of females). 
  The time series patterns in income across the subsamples reveal several differences of note.  
First, there is substantial heterogeneity in incomes across the groups.  For example, the incomes of 
individuals who do not receive any benefit in either 1996 or 1997 (the (0,0) group), is substantially 
higher in all years than that of other individuals.  Column 1 of table 2 shows that, for males, annual 
income is about $40,000 during the period for this group, compared to about $6,000 (market) or 
$12,000 (gross) for those who receive benefits in 1996 and 1997 (column 4).  Also a slight increase 
in incomes over time is apparent in column 1, particularly between 1994 and 1995.  Second, there is 
relatively little year-to-year variation in average incomes within these groups, except for when there 
is a change in benefit receipt status.  For example, in column 2 there is a substantial drop in market 
and gross incomes in 1997, while in column 3 there is a (roughly) equal and opposite increase in 
average incomes in 1997, corresponding to changes in receipt of benefit income.  Similar patterns are 
apparent in table 3 for females, although the average market incomes are markedly lower for women 
than men. 
  The information in tables 2 and 3 allow several simple estimates of the (lagged) effect of 
benefit receipt on current income which, to some extent, parallel the econometric estimates to follow. 
 Table 4 contains several different estimates for males and females.  The most naive estimate, 
presented in rows 1, is obtained by comparing the average 1997 incomes of individuals who did and 
did not receive a benefit in 1996.  Using market incomes (column 1), this estimate is -$32,829 (with a 
standard error of $481) for males, and -$20,986 ($251) for females, and represents 97 and 109 
percent of sample average market incomes respectively.  The estimates using gross income, although 
smaller, remain substantial (-$27,600 for males, and -$13,200 for females).  However, these 
estimates take no account of heterogeneity in individual incomes, or differences due to current 




Table 2:  Description of Income Patterns – Males 
   
 
    Benefit Receipt Sequence (1996,1997)   
 (0,0)  (0,1)  (1,0)  (1,1) 
   
 
Age  37.20 32.62 30.12 33.54 
  (.09) (.44) (.33) (.19) 
 
Market Income in 
   1994  38.78  18.66  12.15  6.51 
  (.41) (.64) (.57) (.21) 
   1995  42.15  22.28  12.22  6.54 
  (.43) (.62) (.51) (.20) 
   1996  43.47  23.58  16.11  5.60 
  (.46) (.58) (.38) (.17) 
   1997  44.06  15.39  24.20  6.23 
  (.47) (.70) (.47) (.18) 
 
Gross Income in 
   1994  39.15  20.28  15.47  12.63 
  (.40) (.59) (.51) (.17) 
   1995  42.30  23.12  15.77  12.85 
  (.43) (.59) (.45) (.16) 
   1996  43.47  23.58  18.58  12.34 
  (.46) (.58) (.36) (.15) 
   1997  44.06  17.92  24.20  12.95 
  (.47) (.67) (.47) (.15) 
 
Benefit/Gross Income in 
   1994  0.04  0.17  0.38  0.64 
  (.001) (.01) (.02) (.01) 
   1995  0.01  0.08  0.37  0.64 
  (.001) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
   1996  0  0  0.20  0.67 
     (.01)  (.01) 
   1997  0  0.26  0  0.66 
   (.01)   (.01) 
 
Number of Observations  11,392  556  686  2,676 
   
 
Notes:  Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.  In the benefit sequences, a “1” represents receipt of 
benefit, and a “0” represents no benefit received.  Incomes are expressed in terms of 1998 ($1,000), adjusted by 




Table 3:  Description of Income Patterns – Females 
   
 
    Benefit Receipt Sequence (1996,1997)   
 (0,0)  (0,1)  (1,0)  (1,1) 
   
 
Age  37.30 32.04 30.50 33.72 
  (.10) (.43) (.37) (.16) 
 
Market Income in 
   1994  24.38  14.23  8.87  4.10 
  (.26) (.52) (.37) (.13) 
   1995  26.11  16.88  9.03  3.99 
  (.21) (.55) (.41) (.12) 
   1996  27.31  17.92  12.69  3.43 
  (.21) (.51) (.41) (.10) 
   1997  27.99  11.28  19.48  3.93 
  (.23) (.41) (.47) (.12) 
 
Gross Income in 
   1994  24.82  15.93  13.00  12.22 
  (.26) (.48) (.37) (.11) 
   1995  26.11  17.80  13.50  12.69 
  (.21) (.53) (.37) (.11) 
   1996  27.31  17.92  15.81  12.74 
  (.21) (.51) (.39) (.10) 
   1997  27.99  14.63  19.48  13.26 
  (.23) (.38) (.47) (.11) 
 
Benefit/Gross Income in 
   1994  0.04  0.17  0.40  0.72 
  (.002) (.01) (.02) (.01) 
   1995  0.02  0.09  0.40  0.74 
  (.001) (.01) (.02) (.01) 
   1996  0  0  0.28  0.78 
     (.01)  (.01) 
   1997  0  0.32  0  0.77 
   (.01)   (.01) 
 
Number of Observations  9,445  512  622  3,745 
   
 
Notes:  Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.  In the benefit sequences, a “1” represents receipt of 
benefit, and a “0” represents no benefit received.  Incomes are expressed in terms of 1998 ($1,000), adjusted by 




Table 4:  Non-Econometric Estimates of the Effect of Benefit Receipt on Future Income 
   
 
  Estimate  Market Income    Gross Income 




1. y1997(1.) – y1997(0.) -32,829  -27,598 
   (481)  (475) 
 
 
2. y1997(10) – y1997(00) -19,860  -19,860 
   (665)  (665) 
 
 y 1997(11) – y1997(01) -9,160  -4,970 
   (723)  (687) 
 
 
3. y1997(10) – y1996(01) -100 -40 






1. y1997(1.) – y1997(0.) -20,986  -13,157 
   (251)  (248) 
 
 
2. y1997(10) – y1997(00) -8,510  -8,510 
   (523)  (523) 
 
 y 1997(11) – y1997(01) -7,350  -1,370 
   (427)  (396) 
 
 
3. y1997(10) – y1996(01) 150  380 
   – (y1996(10) – y1997(01)) (904)  (882) 
   
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates are based on average incomes presented in table 2.  In the 
notation used, a “1” in the first position indicates benefit receipt, while a “0” indicates no benefit receipt, in 
1996; similarly, the second position “0” or “1” indicates benefit (non-)receipt in 1997.  Thus, for example, 
y1997(10) is the average income in 1997 of individuals who received benefits in 1996 and no benefits in 1997; 




  The second estimate we consider controls for the effect of current benefit receipt and measures 
the difference between 1997 incomes of individuals who did and did not receive a benefit in 1996, 
but have the same 1997 benefit status.  This provides two estimates, according to 1997 benefit status. 
 The estimate for males is -$19,860 ($665) conditional on 1997 non-benefit receipt, and -$9,160 
($723) conditional on 1997 benefit receipt.  For females, the corresponding estimates using market 
incomes are -$8,510 ($523) and -$7,350 ($427).  Again the estimates using gross income tend to be 
smaller but still quite large.  Comparing these estimates with the naïve estimates in row 1 suggests 
the importance of current benefit status in estimating the effect of past benefit receipt on current 
income levels.  Also, comparing the two sets of estimates presented in row 2 for either measure of 
income suggests the importance of heterogeneity in individual incomes across benefit sequences: this 
is particularly so for males, where the second estimate using market income is less than half the first 
estimate. 
  Finally, we consider a third estimate of the effect of lagged benefit status, which controls for 
heterogeneous incomes across benefit sequences under the assumption that income process is 
stationary.  Under this assumption, if benefit receipt only affects contemporaneous income, we would 
expect the income gains, when moving off benefits (column 3 in tables 2 and 3) should be the same 
as the income losses when moving onto benefits (column 2 in tables 2 and 3).  In contrast, if benefit 
receipt adversely affects (future) income, we would expect the income gain for individuals moving 
off benefits to be lower than the income loss of individuals moving onto benefits.  Thus, the third 
estimator we consider is a “difference-in-differences” estimator of the 1996 and 1997 incomes of 
individuals who experience a change in benefit-receipt status between 1996 and 1997 (i.e., columns 2 
and 3 in tables 2 and 3).  In particular, we compare the income growth of individuals who move out 
of benefit status in 1997 with the income loss of individuals who move into benefit status in 1997: / 
= (y1997(1,0) – y1996(1,0)) – (y1996(0,1) – y1997(0,1)), where (e.g.) y1996(1,0) is the average 1996 income of 
individuals who received benefit in 1996 but not in 1997.  For males, the estimated effect of lagged 
benefit on market income is -$100 ($1,092), and for females $150 ($904).  The estimates are small 
and suggest there is little effect of lagged benefit receipt on individuals’ current income.  It is also 
worth noting that the level of precision of these estimates is such that an estimate on the order of 
$2,000 would be needed before it was considered statistically significantly different from zero.  This 
represents about 6 percent of average income for males and nearly 10 percent for females. 
 
Econometric Analysis 
  We now turn our attention to the econometric analysis which controls for spurious effects more 
systematically.  Table 5 contains the results of the effects of benefits on log(gross income) for several 
econometric specifications.  In addition to the variables listed in the table, unrestricted age effects are 
included in all specifications.  Column (1) presents Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates for the 
simplest dynamic specification, equation (2), estimated in levels and ignoring possible unobserved 
heterogeneity.
10 These results imply that lagged benefit receipt has a strong negative effect on current 
gross income, reducing male and female gross incomes by 23 and 9 percent respectively.  In addition 
there is a first-order income dynamic effect of about 0.7 for both males and females: assuming this 
specification is valid, this implies that about 50 percent of contemporaneous income differences 





Table 5:  Econometric Estimates of the Effect of Benefit Receipt on Log(Gross Income) 
   
 
Coefficient  on (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
   
 
Males 
yit-1 (￿)  0.685  0.409 0.388 0.362 0.288 0.390 
  (.007)  (.032) (.033) (.029) (.109) (.078) 
 
Bit (/0) ---  ---  -0.177 -0.182 -1.384  0.128 
     (.023) (.023) (1.38) (.860) 
 
Bit-1 (/1) -0.231  0.093  0.045  0.037  0.468  -0.130 
  (.014)  (.022) (.023) (.023) (.549) (.342) 
 
Estimated /
(a) -0.231  0.093  -0.024  -0.029  0.070  -0.080 
  (.014)  (.022) (.026) (.025) (.301) (.048) 
 
Over-identification ---  ---  ---  3.011  --- 2.487 
       (.08)    (0.11) 
 
Females 
yit-1 (￿)  0.734  0.304 0.302 0.291 0.387 0.399
  (.007)  (.023) (.022) (.022) (.065) (.069) 
Bit (/0) ---  ---  -0.040  -0.041 2.434 2.946 
     (.025) (.025) (1.74) (1.76) 
 
Bit-1 (/1)  -0.092  0.034  0.024  0.023 -1.134 -1.332 
  (.013)  (.023) (.024) (.024) (.672) (.680) 
 
Estimated /
(a)  -0.092  0.034  0.012  0.011 -0.193 -0.157 
  (.013)  (.023) (.027) (.027) (.179) (.241) 
 
Over-identification ---  ---  ---  5.027  --- 0.436 
       (.03)    (0.51) 
       
 
Notes:  In all specifications, y = log(gross income), and B = 1(benefit income>0), is a dummy variable for 
whether the individual has any benefit income.  All regressions include unrestricted age effects.  Estimated 
standard errors in parentheses, except p-value for the Over-identification statistic. 
 (a) In columns (1) and (2), /=coefficient on lagged Benefit receipt; in columns (3) – (5), the implied 
estimate of /=/1 + ￿/0. 
Model (1) is equation (2) in text, estimated in levels. 
Model (2) is equation (3) in text, estimated in first-differences using yit-2 as an instrument for ßyit-1.  
Model (3) is equation (4¢) in text, estimated in first-differences using yit-2 as an instrument for ßyit-1. 
Model (4) is equation (4¢) in text, estimated in first-differences using yit-2 and yit-3 as instruments for ßyit-1. 
Model (5) is equation (4¢) in text, estimated in first-differences using yit-2, Bit-2 and Bit-3 as instruments for ßyit-1, 
ßBit and ßBit-1. 
Model (6) is equation (4¢) in text, estimated in first-differences using yit-2, yit-3, Bit-2 and Bit-3 as instruments for 




  If there is unobserved heterogeneity, the OLS estimate of ￿ in column (1) will be biased 
upwards. Also, if the unobserved heterogeneity is negatively correlated with benefit receipt (e.g., 
individuals with higher income due to unobservable factors will be less likely to receive benefit), the 
OLS estimate of / will be biased downwards.  To examine the effects of unobserved heterogeneity, 
arbitrary individual-specific fixed effects are allowed.
12 This specification is estimated in first-
differences using yit-2 as an instrument for ßyit-1, and the results are presented in column (2) of table 
5.
13 There are two changes of note from the results in column (1), which confirm the presence of 
substantial unobserved heterogeneity in incomes over time.  First, the estimated first-order income 
dynamic effects are substantially smaller: 0.4 for males, and 0.3 for females.
14 These estimates of the 
dynamics imply that the regression towards individual means is relatively quick, while the 
unobserved heterogeneity accounts for about 45 percent of the total variation in individual incomes.  
Second, the estimated effect of lagged benefit receipt on current income is now positive for both 
males and females.  The estimate for males implies that lagged benefit receipt increases male income 
by 9 percent; for females, the estimated effect is 3 percent but not statistically different from zero. 
  As discussed above, the estimated positive effect of lagged benefit receipt on current income 
by be the result of omitted variable bias and a spurious correlation.  To examine these issues, we next 
include contemporaneous benefit receipt in the regression, and impose the restrictions implied in 
equation (4¢) in determining the benefit dependence effect of interest (/).  Estimates from these 
specifications are presented in the remaining columns of table 5.  In column (3), we maintain the 
assumption that ßBit and ßBit-1 are exogenous with respect to ßuit and instrument ßyit-1 using yit-2.  In 
this specification, the estimated first-order dynamics are little changed from column (2).  As 
expected, the unrestricted coefficients on current benefit receipt are negative, although not 
statistically so for females, while the coefficients on lagged benefit are insignificantly positive for 
both males and females.  The implied estimate of / in this specification is negative for males and 
positive for females, although both estimates are not statistically different from zero.  It is worth 
noting here that the coefficient standard errors are little changed from column (2), which implies that 
collinearity is not an issue in this specification.  Next, in column (4), we also include yit-3 as an 
instrument for ßyit-1, and test whether the implied over-identification restrictions are valid.  The p-
values associated with the over-identification test reject the implied restrictions, particularly for 
females, and suggests that a first-order dynamic specification is too parsimonious.  However, despite 
this result, the coefficient estimates are almost identical to those in column (3).
15 
  We now consider the possibility that transitory income shocks will be correlated with benefit 
receipt, in which case ßBit and ßBit-1 will be correlated with ßuit.  The final two columns in table 3 
contain estimates in this situation.  In column (5), yit-2, Bit-2 and Bit-3 are used as instruments for ßyit-1, 
ßBit and ßBit-1.  Compared to the results in column (3), there is a substantial loss in precision in the 
estimates in this specification, which implies that Bit-2 and Bit-3 are relatively weak instruments.  
Consequently, although the point the estimates of / are quite large, they are insignificantly different 
from zero.  In column (6), we present the results when yit-3 is added to the instrument set.  This tends 
to improve the precision for males, but not for females.  The estimate of / for males from this 
specification implies that lagged benefit receipt tends to reduce gross income by 8 percent, and is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  The over-identification test statistics for this 
specification provide no evidence against the validity of the instrument set, although this may reflect 
the weakness in the instrument set rather than any power to detect inconsistent instruments.  In order 
to try to improve the quality of the instruments for this specification, we included the two interaction 
variables yit-2*Bit-2 and yit-3*Bit-3 in the set of instruments.  The results, presented in column (4) of 
appendix table A1, indicate that these additions improve the fit quite a bit – e.g., the standard errors 
of the unrestricted coefficient estimates are approximately halved.  For males, there is little effect on 
estimate of the parameter of interest, /, or its standard error; for females, the estimate is large and 




Table 6:  Econometric Estimates of the Effect of Benefits on Alternative Market Outcomes 
   
 
  y =  Log(Gross Income)  Market Income  1(Market Income>0) 
 
 B  =    Benefit/Gross  Income    1(Benefit>0)    1(Benefit>0)  
 
Coefficient  on (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
   
 
Males 
yit-1 (￿)  0.371 0.342 0.009  -0.001 0.234 0.243 
 (.028)  (.028)  (.016)  (.019)    (.018)  (.108) 
 
Bit (/0)  -0.029 -0.231 -7.943  -15.552 -0.035 -0.008 
 (.008)  (.070)  (.691)  (8.43)    (.006)  (.501) 
 
Bit-1 (/1)  0.125 -0.442 -0.981  3.919 -0.010 -0.022 
 (.016)  (.185)  (.681)  (3.22)    (.006)  (.203) 
 
Estimated /
(a)  0.114 -0.521 -1.054  3.931 -0.018 -0.024 
 (.018)  (.208)  (.670)  (3.39)    (.007)  (.083) 
 
Over-identification  2.678 1.124  21.426 7.526 3.354 1.118 




yit-1 (￿)  0.332 0.336 0.151 0.119 0.297 0.239 
 (.023)  (.028)  (.030)  (.029)    (.020)  (.052) 
 
Bit (/0)  -0.003 -0.006 -6.248  -16.197 -0.041 -0.679 
 (.0002)  (.003)  (.437)  (4.44)    (.009)  (.442) 
 
Bit-1 (/1) 0.002  0.001  0.011  3.131  -0.013  0.245 
 (.0004)  (.0004)  (.459)  (1.38)    (.008)  (.163) 
 
Estimated /
(a) 0.001  -0.002  -0.933 1.198 0.026 0.083 
 (.0004)  (.001)  (.429)  (1.21)    (.009)  (.092) 
 
Over-identification  5.392 4.178 3.779 3.073 7.106 2.274 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.03)   (0.01)  (0.08) 
       
 
Notes:  Estimated standard errors in parentheses, except p-value for the Over-identification statistic.  All 
regressions include unrestricted age effects. 
  (a) Estimate of /=/1 + ￿/0. 
Models (1), (3) and (5) is equation (4¢) in text, estimated in first-differences using yit-2, and yit-3 as instruments 
for ßyit-1. 
Models (2), (4) and (6) is equation (4¢) in text, estimated in first-differences using yit-2, yit-3, Bit-2 and Bit-3 as 





  In order to examine the robustness of the results above, we next discuss results using various 
alternative specifications for the dependent outcome of interest and/or the benefit variable.  Table 6 
contains the results for this exercise for specifications corresponding to those in table 5, columns (4) 
and (6) – i.e. first, ßyit-1 is instrumented and, second, ßyit-1, ßBit and ßBit-1 are instrumented.
16 First, in 
order to examine whether a binary variable for benefit receipt is a suitable measure, we consider the 
effect on log(gross income) of benefit income intensity, as defined by the fraction of gross income 
that is from benefits.  In column (1), when only ßyit-1 is instrumented, the over-identification statistic 
provides support for the instrument set for males, while it rejects the consistency of the instrument 
set at the 2 percent level for females.  In this specification the effects of lagged benefit receipt on 
current income are positive and statistically significant for both sexes.  However, the magnitudes of 
the effects are small: a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of gross income from benefits 
increases gross income by 1 percent for males, and 0.01 percent for females.  Column (2) contains 
the results when ßBit and ßBit-1 are also instrumented.  In this case, the results for males imply a 10 
percentage point increase in the fraction of gross income from benefits reduces income by about 5 
percent, while for females a 10 percent increase in the benefit/gross income ratio reduces female 
gross income by 0.02 percent. 
  Next, we consider the effect of benefit receipt on market income, measured in levels rather 
than logs to allow for the presence of zero market incomes.  The results for this exercise are 
presented in columns (3) and (4).  For each case, the over-identification statistic strongly rejects the 
consistency of the instrument sets.  The standard errors on the benefit variables when these are 
instrumented again suggest that the instruments used are weak.  For females, the estimates in column 
(3) imply statistically significant negative benefit dependence effects on market income of $900 
when only ßyit-1 is instrumented. 
  The final outcome variable we consider is a binary variable for whether the individual has any 
market income, which is used as a measure of market participation.  For ease of manipulation we use 
a linear probability specification for this analysis.
17 The results for this specification imply negative 
benefit dependence for males and positive for females, although not statistically different from zero 
when the benefit variables are instrumented for.  Again the over-identification statistics reject the 
consistency of the instrument sets – strongly for females, and weakly for males. 
 
 
  V:  Concluding Discussion 
 
  This paper provides an investigation of the persistence effects of benefit receipt on various 
measures of future income.  The analysis used a parsimonious dynamic econometric specification to 
control for spurious factors which may bias the dependence effects of interest.  As expected, ignoring 
unobserved heterogeneity and other confounding factors, the results show that benefit receipt has a 
large and negative effect on individuals’ future income.  Controlling for unobserved differences 
between individuals, the results indicate that lagged benefit receipt has a positive effect on income.  
However, once suitable controls for other confounding effects have been made, there is little robust 
evidence of either a positive or negative effect of benefit persistence on individuals’ income or other 
outcomes.  What is clear from this study is that differences between individuals, as opposed to 
benefit receipt per se, account for much of the observed correlation between benefit receipt and 
income.  How much of these differences between individuals are due to ability, skills, location, 
discrimination, or preferences for work is unclear and cannot be revealed with this data. 
  However, there are possible caveats to the analysis and conclusions.  The most important is 
that, in the preferred specifications which allow benefit receipt to be correlated with time-varying 




effects, including the possibility that welfare does act to some extent as a trap.  To some extent this 
reflects an inherent difficulty faced in identifying the effects of interest in the presence of several 
confounding factors. 
  In addition to the results concerning the persistent effects of benefit receipt, the analysis also 
sheds some light on individual income dynamics.  First, the results illustrate that it is important to 
control for unobservable factors in modeling individual income dynamics.  Allowing for an 
individual-specific fixed effect in income, the results show that this explains nearly half of the total 
variation in individuals incomes, while the estimated dynamics parameter falls rom about 0.7 to 
between 0.3 and 0.4.  Second, although the over-identification tests and more general dynamic 
specifications provide some evidence against a first-order income dynamics specification, which 
could bias the results, this specification appears to capture most of the income dynamics.  For 
example, allowing for second-order dynamics results in a very small effect of yit-2 on yit, and little 
change in the estimated effect of yit-1.  However, there is no evidence that relaxing this specification 
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Table A1:  Econometric Estimates of the Effect of Benefits on Log(Gross Income) 
   
Coefficient  on (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
 
Males 
yit-1 (￿) 0.561  -0.335  0.414  0.363 
 (.009)  (.009)  (.042)  (.042) 
 
yit-2 0.196  --- 0.023  --- 
 (.009)    (.014) 
 
Bit (/0) ---  ---  -0.172 -0.167 
     (.024)  (.336) 
 
Bit-1 (/1) -0.165  -0.072  0.055  -0.009 
 (.014)  (.017)  (.026)  (.131) 
 
Estimated /
(a) -0.165 -0.072 -0.016 -0.070 
 (.014)  (.017)  (.028)  (.048) 
 
Over-identification ---  ---  ---  1.093 
       (0.35) 
 
Females 
yit-1 (￿) 0.632  -0.243  0.322  0.345 
 (.009)  (.008)  (.026)  (.039) 
 
yit-2 0.144  --- 0.023  --- 
 (.009)    (.011) 
 
Bit (/0) ---  ---  -0.038 1.296 
     (.026)  (.806) 
 
Bit-1 (/1) -0.073  -0.003  0.028  -0.701 
 (.013)  (.020)  (.024)  (.322) 
 
Estimated /
(a) -0.073 -0.003 0.016 -0.253 
 (.013)  (.020)  (.017)  (.074) 
 
Over-identification ---  ---  ---  2.130 
       (0.09) 
       
 
Notes:  In all specifications, y = log(gross income), and B = 1(benefit income>0), is a dummy variable for 
whether the individual has any benefit income.  All regressions include unrestricted age effects.  Estimated 
standard errors in parentheses, except p-value for the Over-identification statistic. 
 (a) In columns (1) and (2), /=coefficient on lagged Benefit receipt; in columns (3) – (5), the implied 
estimate of /=/1 + ￿/0. 
Model (1) is estimated in levels by OLS. 
Model (2) is estimated in first-differences by OLS. 
Model (3) is estimated in first-differences, using yit-3 as an instrument for ßyit-1. 
Model (4) is estimated in first-differences, using yit-2, yit-3, Bit-2, Bit-3, and interactions yit-2*Bit-2 & yit-3*Bit-3 as 
instruments for ßyit-1, ßBit and ßBit-1.  
 
 
   
1 Ashenfelter (1983) discusses a variety of issues associated with participation in welfare programs. 
 
2 A possible, although less expected, alternative is that benefit receipt actually has a positive effect on future 
income – e.g., if benefit receipt enables individuals to maintain or improve their health or human capital 
capabilities, then their income opportunities may improve as a result. 
 
3 Although our preferred specification is equation (4), there are alternative restrictions.  Perhaps the most 
obvious alternative is to allow lagged benefits to have a spurious effect on yit which is equal and opposite to the 
contemporaneous effect: 
(3¢)   yit = Xit¢b + gyit-1 + d0(Bit – Bit-1) + dBit-1 + ai + uit. 
 
4 It is worth noting that even with quite rich survey data unobservable factors tend to remain important in -- e.g. 
typical wage or income regressions estimated using US survey data can explain up to 30 percent of the observed 
variation, while about one-half of the unexplained variation persists over time and so can be attributed to 
systematic unobserved factors.  In addition, age or experience is generally the observable factor which has the 
highest explanatory power. 
 
5 A more detailed discussion of the database is provided in Hyslop and Smith (1999). 
 
6 The low-income limits were $20,000 in the 1994-96 tax years, and $34,200 in 1997. 
 
7 There is no information on the database concerning interest income and withholding tax. 
 
8 It is not possible to identify the individual for approximately 5 percent of TDCs; however, this figure is lower 
for employer earnings and DSW benefit TDCs which forms the population of primary focus in this paper.  It is 
possible to examine the accuracy of the IR information provided by individuals by comparing the TDC and IR 
reported PAYE incomes of individuals for which both is available.  Compared to most survey data, we believe 
the reported income information is quite accurate.  For example, we find that the PAYE incomes are (exactly) 
equal in 80 percent of matches, and lie within 10 percent of each other in about half of the remaining matches. 
 
9 Even in the presence of “perfect data”, it is not clear that either analytical approach dominates, as the panel 
modeling approach is more flexible in handling (unobserved) heterogeneity, while the duration analysis allows 
more flexible forms of state dependence. 
 
10 This specification is the closest to those estimated by Creedy (1997) using data from the same database for an 
earlier period and with only individuals IR tax-return information.  Although Creedy does not allow for 
permanent unobserved effects, his specifications do allow for the error term to follow a stationary first-order 
autoregressive process, which translates into a second-order dynamic income process.  For these reasons, our 
results are not directly comparable to Creedy's, however the results here are broadly similar.  Coleman (1996) 
provides a useful discussion and critique of Creedy's specifications. 
 
11 Column (1) in appendix table A1 contains the results when the second lag of log(gross income), yit-2, is 
included in the model.  For both males and females, the coefficient on yit-1 falls by 15-20 percent, and the 
coefficient on yit-2 is statistically significantly positive, but substantially smaller than the coefficient on yit-1. 
 
12 Given the absence of any demographic information, other than age and sex, on the IRD database any 
unobserved heterogeneity will include the effects of commonly observed characteristics such as education and 
ethnicity, as well as other unobserved factors which have a persistent effect on individuals’ incomes. 
 





13 If benefit receipt is correlated only with the permanent component of error, then a consistent estimate of / can 
be obtained without instrumenting ßBit-1.  We return to this issue later. 
 
14 Column (2) of appendix table A1 contains the OLS results for this specification.  The OLS estimate of the 
lagged dependent variable is significantly negative due to the strong negative correlation between ßyit-1 and ßuit-1 
as a result of first-differencing. 
 
15 We have also reestimated the model with second-order dynamics (i.e. including the yit-2), and using just yit-3 as 
an instrument for ßyit-1.  The results from this specification, presented in column (3) of appendix table A1, 
support the view that while there is a statistically significant second-order dynamic effect, it has a marginal 
impact on the results. 
 
16 In the latter cases, we also include interactions between yit-2 and Bit-2, and between yit-3 and Bit-3 as instruments 
in order to improve the precision of the estimates. 
 
17 The choice of linear specification for binary outcome should have little effect on estimating mean-effects – see 
Hyslop (1999) for results in a similar context. 
 